Exploring Syria’s Future: Thomas Schmidinger on Rojava and Its Role

Perhaps one should take a look at long-standing federal systems such as Switzerland or the USA to see that these can also be well-functioning models for states that are characterized by high levels of diversity.

In the evolving landscape of northern Syria, multiple forces compete for influence and control, reshaping traditional power structures and governance models. While Rojava advances its democratic confederalist model in the northeast through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has undergone its own transformation in other parts of Syria, presenting new challenges and dynamics to regional stability. These parallel developments have heightened the urgency of addressing questions of governance, military organization, and international recognition. In conversation with Thomas Schmidinger, Infowelat examine how these competing models of authority and governance interact to shape Syria’s future.

“HTS is attempting to rebrand itself and establish civil governance in Damascus. How does this development affect Rojava and the SDF’s position in northern Syria? Furthermore, how do Rojava’s democratic confederalist model and HTS’s governance approach—aiming to re-establish a centralized model with a radical Islamic perspective—interact and influence each other?”

The main problem at the moment is clearly between the Turkish mercenaries of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and not between the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian Democratic Forces. While the HTS fought against the regime in late November and early December, the SNA fought against the SDF and to this day the HTS has not touched the Kurdish neighbourhood of Aleppo, while the SNA, together with Turkey, is attacking the region around Kobani on a daily basis. There may be an opportunity for HTS and SDF to come to an understanding at least on one level, namely in the attempt to restore Syria’s sovereignty. But otherwise, of course, there are very big problems. Ideologically, the two camps are diametrically opposed, but the HTS in particular has always declared that it wants a centralised state and rejects any form of federalism. The Druze or Alawites would probably have more allies for this, as would the demand for a secular state, i.e. a state that exists autonomously of religion and is a state of all its citizens – regardless of their religion.

The SDF has developed a unique form of military-civil cooperation. Could you explain how this differs from both state armies and non-state armed groups, particularly in terms of decision-making and accountability? How has Rojava’s experience with the SDF offered new approaches to these challenges?

The main difference to all other military forces is the participation of women in the form of the YPJ Women’s Defence Units, but also in the form of the Christian Bethnahrain Women’s Protection Forces. There is no other entity in Syria with such participation of women in the armed forces, which of course makes it more difficult to integrate the SDF in any way into future Syrian armed forces. Otherwise, it would of course be conceivable to integrate the SDF into a future Syrian army. But with regard to the armed women’s units, a compromise with the HTS and other armed formations is very difficult to imagine.

The region has seen various attempts at alternative governance—from local councils early in the Syrian revolution to HTS’s evolving model in Idlib. How does Rojava’s experience differ, and what lessons might it offer?

These models are of course fundamentally different. The model of self-government in North and East Syria is – at least in theory – a kind of grassroots democracy, but in reality, of course, it is contrasted by the more centralised power structures of the party and the armed forces. However, due to its decentralised nature and inter-ethnic and inter-religious inclusivity, this is a fundamentally different model to the one that the HTS has established in Idlib and is now trying to extend to the whole of Syria. In north-east Syria, great efforts have always been made to include all religious and ethnic groups. The HTS is by definition a purely Sunni Islamic project. The biggest difference here, however, is definitely the difference in the inculcation of women. In northern and eastern Syria, the principle of co-chairmanship means that there is a woman and a man in all positions who share political responsibility. In the transitional government of the HTS, there are only Sunni men and not a single woman. In a strongly federalist model, it would be conceivable that different federal states of a future Syria would also have different local constitutions and political systems. However, these different models cannot be reconciled in a centralised state.

Rojava has established diplomatic offices in several countries despite lacking formal state recognition. How does this parallel diplomacy function in practice? What challenges and opportunities has this created?

But we must not forget that such paradiplomatic beginnings, as we are now seeing through the DAANES, can also become official relations under certain circumstances. The diplomatic relations of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq also began in this way and have now been raised to an official level. But this requires official recognition of the respective autonomous entity by the respective state, in this case by Syria. This can therefore only be a consequence of a certain agreement with the Syrian state. Then these relations can also become more official.

How does Rojava’s model differ from other autonomous regions, particularly in terms of power-sharing and local governance?”

There are efforts are efforts to achieve autonomy among the Druze in the province of Suweida on Jebel Druz, and there are also proposals from the Alawite side, although this will be somewhat more difficult, as some of these come from representatives of the old regime, which was strongly Alawite. However, the HTS and other Arab Sunni groups are currently rejecting all proposals for autonomy. In terms of their centralism, they are no different from the old regime.

Unfortunately, there is hardly any understanding of federal models in the entire Middle East because everyone believes that any federalism is the beginning of separatism. Perhaps one should take a look at long-standing federal systems such as Switzerland or the USA to see that these can also be well-functioning models for states that are characterized by high levels of diversity.

How might the SDF’s integration of different ethnic and religious groups into both military and civilian governance structures might influence future discussions about Syria’s reconstruction and reconciliation?

This would of course be one approach to a more inclusive model, but this must first be argued with those who form the majority and are now in power in Damascus.

Considering the various models of governance that have emerged during the Syrian conflict, how do you see Rojava’s system potentially influencing or contributing to a future Syrian settlement?

This will also depend on how much Rojava will be involved in the future Syria and who will prevail within Rojava, the forces oriented towards Syria or those that are primarily oriented towards Turkey and the Kurdish question there. It will be very crucial in the next few months that other Syrians also see that the decisions are being made in North and East Syria and not in Qandil. If the Syrians outside Rojava see that this is really a grassroots democratic self-government and that the local population can therefore seriously and independently formulate a political will, then this can also set an example for other groups that do not want to be dominated by the central state. But if the impression arises that in the end the decisions are not made in Rojava but by guerrilla commanders in the mountains or in Imrali, i.e. not by Syrian Kurds, Christians and Arabs in Syria, then hardly anyone will take a closer look at this model.

Many other Syrians have long been accusing or at least suspecting that in the end the decisions are not made in northern and eastern Syria and that everything is not as grassroots democratic as it appears at first glance. These critics could now be proved wrong by political actions rather than statements, if one can be credible in the new political landscape. For example, I think it is important for the Kurdish parties to become active in Damascus, Latakia, Homs or Suweida and open offices and explain their positions to the population there too.

Europe and US have been holding meetings with a religion based organisation which was before designated as “terrorist” by them. On the other hand, beside being a partner of Europe and US in the region, Kurds have the most secular political organisations. What is the reason behind the decision of Western powers insistently prefer to accept HTS as the “legitimate” representative of Syria?

The fact that governments are seeking dialogue with groups that were previously considered terrorists is nothing new. The main reason for being in talks with HTS-leaders is quite simply that they won the war – not alone, of course, but they is a decisive factor. European governments hope that they can contribute to stabilizing Syria through talks. This can work if, in return for easing sanctions and providing reconstruction aid, HTS is pressured to respect human rights – including women’s and minority rights – and to work on a more inclusive transitional government. But if one only focuses on stability in order to prevent more refugees and does not keep an eye on human rights and democratization, then that would be extremely short-sighted, because lasting stabilization is obviously not possible that way.

However, it will also be crucial whether it is possible to push back Turkish influence and restore Syrian sovereignty. In this regard, it may make sense to maintain relations with the new Syrian transitional government, but these relations should also include others like the DAANES or the different religious minorities in Syrie. And finally the Arab neighboring states and perhaps even Israel – although it has its own interests in Syria – can play at least an equally important role in containing Turkey as the EU.

Photo: Thomas Schmidinger/Courtesy of Thomas Schmidinger’s personal archive

“Neslihan Yaklav, PhD student in Political Science at Queen’s University Belfast, collaborated with Infowelat for concept of the whole interview. Special thanks to Yaklav for her valuable support and insights throughout the process.”

 

Derbarê infowelat.com

Li vê jî binêre

Dadgeha Gelan Tirkîyeyê sûcdar dît

Dadgeha Gelan li Brukselê biryar da: Êrîşên Tirkiyeyê yên li ser xaka Sûriyeyê yên bêyî …